pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA, H.R. 5724): violence against trade
unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker
rights protections for Colombians.1 For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report
RL34470, A U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and Political Implications, by M.
Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the
agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and
Clare Ribando Seelke.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three
points: (1) the high rate of violence (murders, arbitrary detentions/kidnappings, and death threats)
against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of
that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO)
core labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of
economic and national security benefits. Trade typically benefits all parties to a trade agreement,
as each country tends to specialize in exporting those goods which it can produce relatively more
efficiently, and to import those which it produces relatively less efficiently. Accordingly,
proponents argue, the CFTA would: support increased exports, expand economic growth, create
jobs, offer consumers a greater variety of goods and services at lower prices, and encourage
economic development by attracting foreign investment and expanding output. They also argue
that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor
hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) murders and kidnappings
against trade unionists have declined dramatically since President Álvaro Uribe took office in
2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has
undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian
government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers.
Background
Political Context[2]
Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and has a bicameral legislature. Yet
it has been plagued by an ongoing armed conflict for over 40 years. This violence has been
aggravated by a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory rugged terrain that has
been hard to govern. In addition, a long history of poverty and inequality has left Colombia open
to other influences, among them drug trafficking. Leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban
Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing
paramilitaries formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of whom were drug traffickers,
against guerrillas. The shift of coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s
increased drug violence and provided a new source of revenue for both guerrillas and
paramilitaries. In 2002 Colombians elected an independent, Álvaro Uribe, as President, largely
because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia.
Trade/Economic Context
Colombia is the United States' fourth largest trading partner in Latin America, and its 33rd largest
import source and 26th largest export destination world-wide. Machinery, organic chemicals, and
cereals constitute half of total exports to Colombia, and petroleum accounts for 41% of all
imports from Colombia. Given the relatively small level of trade between the United States and
Colombia, the CFTA would, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission report, likely
have minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy.3
U.S. proponents argue that the proposed CFTA would provide a number of economic benefits,
including market access for U.S. consumer and industrial products; cooperation in the production
of textiles and apparel; and new opportunities for U.S. farmers and ranchers.4 However, the trade
effect overall is expected to be very small. The largest changes in U.S. output are projected for the
cereal grains production sector (0.3%) and the sugar sector (-0.3%); the largest changes in U.S.
employment are projected to be in cereal grains (0.3%), sugar cane (-0.3%), and textiles (-0.3%.)5
Colombia's exports to the United States already enter the United States mostly duty-free under
the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). However, new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result
of the agreement could support increased economic growth and employment and additional
exports to the United States.
Colombian proponents argue that the only Western Hemisphere "Pacific Rim" countries with
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement are Colombia, Ecuador, and
Panama. The United States has FTAs with all others: Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile. The investment that goes into these other
countries from the United States as a result, the Colombian Embassy argues, means that new
exports from Latin America to the United States are increasingly coming from non-Colombian
countries, putting Colombia at an economic disadvantage relative to its neighbors.6
Labor Context
Colombia's official labor force is about 18.2 million, as compared with 138 million for the United
States. Roughly 23% of Colombia's labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, 19% is
involved in the manufacturing/industry sector, and 58% is employed in the service sector. Almost
60% of the workforce in Colombia is employed in the (largely unregulated, undocumented)
informal sector. The unemployment rate in Colombia is roughly 11.8% in 2008. During most of
the more than 40 years that Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict, membership and
participation in labor unions has waned. Between 1959 and 1965, the unionization rate grew from
5.5% to 13.5%. Since 1966, the unionization rate has declined to 4% or 742,000 of the 18.2
million workforce. Of these, fewer than 150,000, or 0.8% of the labor force are working under a
labor contract.7
Endnotes
1
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed on November 22, 2006. Implementing
legislation was introduced on April 8, 2008 as H.R. 5724 and S. 2830. On April 9, 2008, through H.Res. 1092 (Report
110-575) the House made certain provisions under "trade promotion authority" (otherwise known as the "fast-track")
inapplicable to the CFTA, so that it is no longer obligated to vote within 60 days of a session and may schedule a vote
at any time. This stopped the fast-track clock. For more information on the fast-track or trade promotion process, see
CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Issues, Options, and Prospects for Renewal, by J. F.
Hornbeck and William H. Cooper; and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor
Standards Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle.
2
This section was taken from CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare
Ribando Seelke.
3
U.S. International Trade Commission. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and
Selected Sectoral Effects, December, 2006. P. 2-13.
4
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Colombia FTA Facts, October 2008.
5
USITC U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, op. cit.
6
Colombian embassy, in an interview, November 20, 2008.
7
Data in this paragraph are from Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report Colombia, October 2008, p. 16; U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007, published
March 2008.
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