The Bush Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released March 16, 2006 said the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran." The perception is based largely on Iran's growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and its ability to exert influence in the region counter to U.S. objectives.11 Iran's national security goals are to protect itself from foreign, primarily U.S., interference or attack, and to be able to protect and defend the Shiite Islamic world that Iran sees as oppressed by the more numerous and dominant Sunnis. Iran's advanced and other conventional weaponry is deemed to pose a less significant threat than its WMD, but Iran's forces could still, in some cases, threaten U.S. forces and allies in the Gulf region.
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force
Iran's armed forces are extensive; they are widely considered relatively combat ineffective against a well-trained, sophisticated military such as that of the United States or a regional power such as Turkey, but believed sufficiently effective to deter or fend off conventional threats from Iran's weaker neighbors such as post-war Iraq, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. Iran's forces lack the logistical ability to project power much beyond Iran's borders. Iran's armed forces have few formal relationships with foreign militaries, but Iran and India have a "strategic dialogue" and some Iranian naval officers reportedly are being trained in India. Iran and Turkey have agreed in principle (April 2008) to jointly fight terrorism along their border. Most of Iran's other military-to-military relationships, such as with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, North Korea, and a few others, generally center on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),12 which also controls the Basij (mobilization) volunteer militia that enforces adherence to Islamic customs, is generally loyal to the hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran's regular military, which is larger but was held over from the Shah's era. The two forces, the Guard and the regular military, technically report to a Joint Headquarters. As further evidence of the Guard's pre-eminence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said on November 29, 2007 that the IRGC Navy was given responsibility to patrol the entire Persian Gulf, and that the regular Navy is patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman.
IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. On September 2, 2007, Khamene'i replaced Rahim Safavi with Mohammad Ali Jafari as Commander In Chief of the Guard; Jafari is considered a hardliner against political dissent and is reputedly close to the Supreme Leader and less so to Ahmadinejad. In December 2007, Jafari briefly took direct control of the Basij, which operates from thousands of positions in Iran's institutions, and indicated he would increase its role in monitoring and suppressing dissent. Later, the Basij command was given to senior Guard leader Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr, who had been serving as deputy Interior Minister, although command reshuffles in July 2008 (integrating the Basij more closely with provincially-based IRGC units) furthered the view that the Basij is playing a more active role in uncovering suspected plotting by Iran's minorities and others. More information on Iran's military and how it might perform against the United States is discussed under "military options" below.
The Guard has a unit, the Qods (Jerusalem) Force, that operates outside Iran to assist pro-Iranian movements with weapons, training, and finances. For the role of the Guard/Qods Force in external activities, see below under "Foreign Policy and Terrorism." The IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran's economy, acting through a network of contracting businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also called Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for "Seal of the Prophet"). Active duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb's board of directors.
In the 110th Congress, a provision of H.R. 1400 (passed by the House on September 25), S. 970, and the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181, Senate amendment adopted September 6, 2007 by vote of 76-22) calls for the Revolutionary Guard to be designated a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO. On October 21, 2007, the Administration took a somewhat lesser step by naming the IRGC, the Ministry of Defense, several of Guard commanders, the Guard’s construction firms, and several Iranian banks, as proliferation entities under Executive Order 13382. The Qods Force was named as a “specially designated global terrorist entity” under Executive Order 13224. Both orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U.S.-based assets that could be frozen. The U.S. action might have substantial effect on the IRGC and its business entities if U.S. partner countries and others adopt similar sanctions. (A list of designated entities is in a table at the end of this paper.)
Table 5. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Military Personnel: 545,000 (regular military and Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). IRGC is about one-third of total force.
Tanks: 1,693 (incl. 480 T-72)
Surface-Air Missiles: 150 I-Hawk plus some Stinger
Combat Aircraft: 280 (incl. 25 MiG-29 and 30 Su-24)
Ships: 200 (incl. 10 Chinese-made Hudong, 40 Boghammer, 3 frigates) Also has 3 Kilo subs
Defense Budget (billions U.S. $): 6.6
“Qods Forces” of IRGC. Approximately 10,000-15,000 total in the Qods Force, which promotes Iran’s regional and global objectives through advisory support to pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Also operates worldwide intelligence network to give Iran possible terrorist option and to assist in procurement of WMD-related technology.
Ship-launched cruise missiles. Iran is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles. Iran also has Chinese-supplied HY-2 Seerseekers emplaced along Iran’s coast.
Midget Subs. Iran is said to possess several, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from North Korea. Iran claimed on Nov. 29, 2007 to have produced a new small sub equipped with sonar-evading technology.
Anti-aircraft missile systems. Russia has sold and now delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1), worth over $1 billion. In September 2006, Ukraine agreed to sell Iran the Kolchuga radar system that can improve Iran’s detection of combat aircraft. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the even more capable S-300 (also known as SA-20 “Gargoyle”) air defense system, purportedly modeled after the U.S. Patriot system, which U.S. officials say would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability. Amid unclear or weak denials by Iranian and Russian officials, U.S. officials told journalists on December 11, 2008 that Iran has indeed contracted for the missile. It is reportedly due for delivery by March 2009 and to be operational by June 2009. In August 2008, Iran denied buying the system at all.
Endnotes
11
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
12
For a more extensive discussion of the IRGC, see Katzman, Kenneth. "The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard," Westview Press, 1993.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
0 comments:
Post a Comment