Covert Action: Conclusion

Covert action has been a significant component of U.S. foreign policy in the
post-World War II world. The reports of the Church, Pike, and Iran-Contra
committees provided a wealth of detailed information about the history of covert
actions undertaken by the United States, but that information is far from
comprehensive; a good deal was left out, and much has happened since the reports
were completed. The considerable amount of information currently available has not
yielded a consensus on the value of covert action programs to the country. The
question remains controversial, but as additional information is gradually declassified,
it will be possible to gain a better appreciation for the importance of the programs that
are known.

If the United States were to deny itself the covert action option, it would be
forced to rely more heavily on other military, diplomatic, and economic instruments
of power. Some opportunities would have to be foregone and some temptations
foreclosed. This is an option with few influential supporters among policymakers and
informed observers, even though covert actions continue to have controversial
reverberations.

The planning and conduct of covert actions has become regularized within the
government. Increasingly, they have become a shared responsibility of the executive
and legislative branches. A substantial body of statutory law and precedent has come
to govern the planning and conduct of covert actions. Covert actions cannot legally
be initiated without presidential approval. Unless the President is prepared to risk a
bitter constitutional dispute, notice of covert actions must also be given to appropriate
Members of Congress. Congress tacitly endorses or withholds approval from covert
actions in authorizing legislation; it can also selectively deny them funds.
Current laws and procedures appear to have fairly deep bipartisan support.
There are few observers, especially at times when Congress and the White House are
under the control of different political parties, who would advocate removal of the
guidelines and restrictions that have been developed over the past quarter-century.
There are, however, more than a few who argue that, once covert actions are
underway, legislative micromanagement should be sharply curtailed. The desirable
size of the Intelligence Community and its budget are disputed and covert capabilities
will presumably be affected even though they are not central in this dispute.

Questions currently do exist regarding the organizational arrangements for
planning and conducting covert actions. Despite the unwillingness of the 104th
Congress to readjust the role of CIA's Operations Directorate, some informed
observers continue to urge consideration of various differing proposals. Most
informed observers acknowledge the complexity of the issue as well as the substantial
merits of opposing arguments. There are clear advantages in having officials
responsible for covert actions closely associated with human intelligence collectors
and with analysts. There would also be clear advantages in removing analysts, and
perhaps collectors, from the inherently secretive and potentially violent environment
of covert actions.

Designing a covert action capability continues to be hampered by the absence of
an overriding national security policy. This may become the normal state of affairs;
no single event, such as the Berlin blockade of 1948, may galvanize Washington
policymakers and the American public around a new policy framework. At the same
time, there are indeed geopolitical concerns in Europe and Asia that could become
very serious. Further, possession of weapons of mass destruction could allow even
an obscure terrorist group to pose an extraordinary threat to vital U.S. interests. The
line between national security and law enforcement has become blurred, with
narcotics smuggling and countermeasures being the most important example. Some
observers (in addition to novelist Tom Clancy) have envisioned using intelligence
operatives to destroy narcotics production and transport facilities. In 1989, a
presidentially appointed Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
recommended use of covert actions in certain situations "to preempt, disrupt or
respond to terrorist actions."107

In the absence of an overarching national security policy, capabilities for covert
action will probably be maintained with one eye on potential threats and opportunities
and the other on costs and uncertain domestic backing. Those in the CIA responsible
for planning and undertaking covert actions, as well as their executive branch and
congressional overseers, will probably move with caution, and undoubtedly in the
view of some critics, with excessive caution.

Appendix: Dod and Covert Action
E.O. 12333 specifically authorizes the CIA to conduct special activities approved
by the President and adds (in section 1.8(e)) that

No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in
time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report
from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87
Stat. 855)) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines
that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.

The extent to which Presidents have made such determinations is not publicly
known, but this provision suggests that the Defense Department may be assigned
responsibilities for certain types of covert action, even in peacetime.
In some areas, an official DOD presence could provide cover for covert operators
and, when combat or peacekeeping operations are underway, it may be more logical
for the military commanders to conduct covert actions (or special operations requiring
a degree of deniability and, thus, fairly described as covert actions) in direct support
of operating forces. In the past, the Navy has acted covertly to protect its ships and
installations; ground and air forces have also employed agents for certain operations.

The Defense Humint Service (DHS), established in 1995, centralizes most DOD
capabilities for human intelligence collection. It incorporates defense attaches who
undertake open collection of information as part of their regular duties and other
civilian and military humint collectors. The DHS may also, according to press
reports, have some capability for covert actions, although other DOD components
outside the Intelligence Community, might also be involved, especially in paramilitary
operations. Deployments of military intelligence personnel serving in clandestine
intelligence collection units have been recognized as falling within the National
Security Act's definition of "intelligence activity," about which Congress must be kept
fully and currently informed in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 as
amended.108

In the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 102-88), the Defense
Department was given authority to establish commercial enterprises that would
provide security (i.e., "cover") for intelligence collection activities undertaken
overseas by DOD personnel. Similar to arrangements previously approved for the
CIA and the FBI, such cover usually consists of a civilian business which can shelter
intelligence collectors (in areas where U.S. Embassy officials would be suspect). The
House Report accompanying the FY1991 legislation stipulated that, "the Department
of Defense may not engage in the commercial activities authorized by [this] legislation
to provide cover for covert action...."109 This authority was extended for an additional
three years in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1996 (P.L. 104-93).

Given the involvement of DOD units in human intelligence collection and related
activities, there is inevitably a potential for duplication of effort or failures of
coordination with other parts of the Intelligence Community and with congressional
oversight committees.110 The term "special operations," as used by the Defense
Department, covers a multitude of functions, some of which are functionally
equivalent to covert actions, including some of those undertaken by the CIA.111
Special operations by military units are ordinarily related to other military missions or
hostage rescue operations; normally, they would not extend to efforts to influence
foreign public opinion or political policies. Nonetheless, the dividing line is not
necessarily sharp and the possibility exists that special operations might at some point
be undertaken by DOD to avoid complications arising out of compliance with laws
that regulate covert actions.

Both the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence
Community (the "Aspin-Brown Commission") and the House Intelligence
Committee's IC21 Study have recommended that humint collection be consolidated
in the CIA and such a step, presumably, might constrain DOD's ability to undertake
at least certain types of covert action. The IC21 Study advocated the creation of a
Clandestine Service under the DCI that would include military personnel engaged in
humint operations. This step might constrain the ability of military attaches to
conduct their overt collection activities by appearing to tie them to the CIA.

In some cases, however, covert actions are undertaken by CIA in direct support
of military operations conducted by the Defense Department. They can become
necessary when it is imprudent for diplomatic or other reasons, to insert U.S. military
personnel into a given area. This was especially the case during the Vietnam War, in
the Persian Gulf War, and as an adjunct to peacekeeping operations, such as those in
Haiti and Bosnia. The necessity for close ties was recognized by creating the position
of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support to be held by a
serving officer of flag rank. The need to coordinate covert actions (and humint
collection) with military planners in the Defense Department has been recognized in
a revised Operations Directorate organization. Procedures to coordinate covert
actions directed by CIA personnel (or an ambassador) with military operations have
proven difficult to establish, especially given the reflexive determination by military
personnel to uphold the principle of unity of command.


Endnotes

107
Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, August 4, 1989,
p. 115.
108
See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103d Congress, 1st session, Committee of
Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, House Report 103-377,
November 18, 1993, pp. 28-29.
109
U.S. Congress, 102d Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Rept. 102-37,
April 22, 1991, p. 23. Years earlier, when a Navy humint capability was established during
the Johnson Administration, the organization was specifically not authorized to undertake
covert actions. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Task Force 157: the US Navy's Secret Intelligence
Service, 1966-77," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, January 1996, p. 108.
110
In 1993, the House Intelligence Committee complained of a failure by DOD to provide
notification of clandestine intelligence collection operations and proposed statutory language
to rectify the problem, but dropped the provision in conference after DOD promised better
notifications procedures. See U.S. Congress, 103d Congress, 1st session, House of
Representatives, Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994, Report 103-377, November 18, 1993, pp. 28-29.
111
See John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993, CRS Report
93-697S. During the Reagan Administration an Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) was
established in the Army to gather human intelligence and to undertake certain special
operations. Media accounts suggest that ISA was involved in gathering intelligence in Central
America and Southeast Asia and secretly provided equipment to foreign governments. After
reports of financial irregularities arose, the ISA was disbanded with certain functions
transferred elsewhere. See also the account by Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the
Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1988).